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Abstract
This paper examines charcoal policy in Ghana and conflicts within charcoal producing communities. 
Policies use narratives about charcoal production to blame charcoal burners and to justify the need to 
regulate it. All these policy narratives are underscored by political conflicts over the exercise of power, 
legitimacy and control over resources. This paper argues that there are four distinct types of conflicts 
within charcoal producing districts: 1) conflict between chiefs and local government over regulation and 
control; 2) conflicts between chiefs over exercise of power over subjects and over legitimacy; 3) 
conflicts between chiefs and their subjects over the allodial and use rights in land and extraction of rents; 
and 4) conflicts between categories of charcoal producers with different rights and access to land 
resources. 
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of claims as property simultaneously works to imbue the institution that provides such recognition with 
the recognition of its authority to do so’. 
With regards to legitimacy, it has been argued that the land resource in Africa is a contested arena 
involving two contradicting claims with different sources of legitimacy. While the state and its 
institutions power over land resources is rooted in the formal processes of statutory law or constitution 
- political legitimacy, the traditional authority’s claim of legitimacy and power over land resources is 
drawn from historically constructed social structures and relations embedded in tradition-traditional 
legitimacy (Okoth–Ogendo 1989).Hence, the political legitimacy of state institutions is backed by the 
formal processes of law or constitution while the legitimacy of the traditional authorities (chiefs) is 
backed by sociocultural beliefs, norms and values, perceptions, lineage ties, customs and traditions.
Another perspective about the legitimacy of chiefs in Africa can be deduced from the argument of 
Amanor (1999). He argues that the empowering of chiefs and the incorporation of this invented 
traditional sector into the state as an arm of rural administration by the colonial and post-colonial state, 
created an alliance between traditional authorities (chiefs) and the state in labour, land and natural 
resource administration (Amanor 1999: 43, see also Konings 1986). By implication, therefore, the 
bifurcated status or position of the traditional authorities (chiefs)– representing both the state and the 
people of the community at the same time, guarantees them (chiefs) both formal and informal
legitimation (Gyekye 2013).
This framework presents a holistic view of the charcoal trade and unmasks the power relations and 
the various interests often concealed in environmental policies and policy processes in Africa. Contrary 
to the dominant policy assumptions, communities are highly differentiated and hierarchically stratified:  
politically and economically. This suggests that, institutions and powerful social actors can mobilize the 
narratives that inform policy, or manipulate and exploit policy to control, regulate and maintain access 
to resources, or to capture the benefits that accrue from natural resources. There is therefore the need 
for policies and their implementation to be recognized as negotiated outcomes involving multiple actors 
with different cultures, powers and interests. 
The next sections describe the research area and method used to collect the data, and the study 
context. Further, it describes the types of conflicts in the Ghanaian transitional and savannah zones.  The 
final section provides the summary and conclusion of the study. 
2. Research area and method
This article is based on ethnographic surveys and two months of fieldwork to study the dynamics of 
charcoal production and resource capture in the new frontier of charcoal production. Fieldwork was 
conducted from 2017 to 2018, mainly in the transition and savanna zones of Ghana, which is the main 
centre of charcoal production in Ghana (Nketiah and Asante 2018).  
1. Introduction 
Charcoal is presented in policy as a harmful product-that destroys the environment and thus its 
production must be regulated and controlled. To achieve this goal - regulating and controlling the 
charcoal resource, policies use narratives about charcoal to blame charcoal producers in ways that the 
basic assumptions seem to be taken for granted (Leach and Mearns 1996). This paper is based on field 
research carried out in the West and North Gonja Districts of Ghana. It demonstrates that political 
motives underpin policy using as illustrations the political conflicts that engulf charcoal production in 
the Ghanaian transition and savannah zones.
The main argument of the paper is that there are four distinct types of conflicts within the charcoal 
production districts: 1) conflict between traditional authority (the paramount chiefs) and the local 
government over regulation and control of the charcoal trade; 2) conflict between chiefs over exercise 
of power over subjects and over legitimacy; 3) conflict between chiefs and their subjects over allodial 
and  user rights in land and extraction of rent; and 4) conflict between categories of producers with 
different rights and access to  resources. 
The paper contends that policy is used in an attempt to extend state control and regulation over 
charcoal production and over the charcoal resource. This is in line with the notion that political context 
and interests, especially the range of competing actors’ interests involved shape policy discourses and
outcomes on the ground (Keeley and Scoones 2003). The politics of policy is often marked by a complex 
and messy processes involving a range of competing actors. Thus, contrary to the conventional and 
dominant perspective, policy making does not happen in clear-cut distinct-stages. Rather, policy 
processes are complex and involve interactions between multiple actors with different interests and 
power.
Understanding the policy processes thus requires, among other things, knowledge or awareness of 
the narratives that tell the policy stories and the enabling or constraining power dynamics inherent in 
the policy process (IDS 2006, Bangura 1996). This implies that policy processes also embody power 
struggle, struggles for political legitimacy and social mobilization by multiple institutions and actors at 
various stages and levels.
At the local level, this often reflects a struggle involving multiple social actors, especially, a 
struggle between politico-legal institutions over natural resources and the legitimacy and power of these 
institutions. These struggles often result in some politico- legal institutions reviving or solidifying and 
expanding their power, while others are weakened or eroded altogether (Lund 2008, Sikor and Lund 
2009). It is also argued that in societies characterized by legal pluralism, institutions compete for 
recognition as the legitimate institutions to sanction and validate peoples claims to land resources. In 
the process, the institutions build and consolidate their legitimacy and power among their competitors 
(Lund 2008, Sikor and Lund 2009). Thus, Sikor and Lund (2009:1) assert that ‘the process of recognition 
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3. The context 
Charcoal is mainly produced in the savannah and transitional zones of Ghana, where the hard wood and 
fire-resistant tree species that make the best quality charcoal are found (Amanor 2007). The trees of this 
vegetation zone are robust, resilient and regenerate rapidly from coppice and root suckers, and thus adapt 
well to the environment. The main charcoal producers are migrants from the Sissala area of the Upper 
West Region of Ghana who have the expertise in charcoal burning. They control a large portion of the 
charcoal market and transport trade. The Sissala charcoal producers are socially stratified. Whiles the 
rich Sissala charcoal merchants acquire permits, have their own transport and hire labour, poor Sissala 
charcoal producers only hire their services out to the merchants (ibid).
In the study area, three distinct types of charcoal production occur. The first type consists of small-
scale production by local farmers who are citizens and therefore have secure access to farmland and 
have rights to exploit the tree resources freely. The second production system is characterized by the 
rich individual Sissala charcoal merchants who have strong links to political authorities (both the 
traditional and government bureaucrats). These merchants have capital and can mobilize labour and 
acquire concessions from chiefs to produce charcoal. The third system of production consists of mainly 
the Sissala professional charcoal producers and some other ethnic groups who organized themselves 
into charcoal production groups called gangs. The gang members pool their resources together under 
the group’s leader known as ‘chairman’. The chairman of a gang is responsible for scouting for wood, 
negotiating with the chiefs for concessions and making arrangements for the transportation and 
marketing of the charcoal in the cities. The chairmen are also very rich and powerful persons who have 
access to capital, labour, transport and are well connected to government officials, and the traditional 
authorities (the chiefs). 
In the political hierarchy or chain of command of the Gonja, the Yagbumwura is the overlord of 
the Gonja Kingdom. Below him are the divisional chiefs who in theory owe their offices to appointment
by-the paramount chief, but in practice, they are rulers of independent-states whose subjects owe 
allegiance immediately to them alone and only indirectly, through them to the paramount chief- the 
overlord (Jones 1962).
Migrant Sissala charcoal producers, wishing to gain access to tree resources in the Damango area 
in the Savanna zone, visit the chief of the area where they wish to burn the charcoal to obtain permission. 
They make a token presentation of cola and drinks or a small amount of money. These are given to the 
chief to enable them obtain a permit which grants them rights to exploit trees for charcoal production 
within a particular area. This way of negotiation for concession rights has led to conflict between the 
paramount chief and the sub-chiefs. This is because, initially, the migrant Sissala charcoal burners 
visited the paramount chief first before going to negotiate with the sub-chiefs for their concessions. In 
this way, the token presentation that was supposed to be made to the sub-chiefs and landlords was rather 
During the fieldwork, I interviewed eighty-four (84) individual participants comprising charcoal 
producers, chiefs and elders, gang chairmen or leaders, District Assembly Officers, Assembly Men, 
youth leaders and charcoal transporters. I also observed charcoal production and negotiation processes 
for concessions between charcoal producers and chiefs. The research areas are located in the West and 
North-Gonja Districts, in the Savannah Region of the Republic of Ghana (Figure 1). Three of the case 
communities Soalepe, Soreto No.1 and Soreto No.2 are located in the West-Gonja District and only one 
community, Kupoto, which is one of the largest charcoal production centres, is located in North-Gonja 
District, nine miles from the district capital Daboya. Soalepe is located near the district capital of West-
Gonja, Damango. Sorto No.1 and Sorto 2 are close to each other but a bit far from the capital. The 
communities are in the Gonja traditional area, headed by the paramount chief. The area is on the northern 
boundary of the transitional zone and lies within the Guinea wooded Savannah vegetation. The climate 
is tropical continental. The mean annual rainfall is between 1000mm and 1500mm.
The population of the West-Gonja is 51,716 (Density=10.96/Kmsq) and the population of North-
Gonja District is 55,110 (Density=11.37/Kmsq) (GSS 2010). The Gonja are the majority and the 
indigenous people in the two Districts. Damango serves as the seat of the traditional authority headed 
by the over-lord, and is also the regional capital of the Savannah Region. The area is predominantly 
inhabited by the Gonja but there are also other ethnicities- Hanga, Dagomba, Mamprusi, Tampalma,
Frafra, Dagaaba and Fulani.
Figure 1. Research area
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which is not enough and also not regular, led to intense competition and conflict between local 
government authorities and chiefs over the control and regulation of natural resources and the extraction 
of revenue or rent from the charcoal trade. A chief in one of the case communities stated that ‘the land 
and the trees belong to me and my people the District Assembly has no power over our land and trees’. 
This reflects the tensions, contestations and the struggle between the traditional authorities and the 
District Assemblies over natural resources and over the legitimacy and power of institutions at the local 
level. These major actors- the chiefs and the District Assemblies, any time they need money often 
mobilize narratives about charcoal to blame charcoal burners especially, the migrants. They then 
threaten a ban on charcoal burning, the main source of livelihood for the migrant charcoal burners and 
increasingly, the youth of the communities. Whenever the chiefs ban charcoal production, they say or 
claim that it is a government policy whiles the District Assemblies justify their ban by saying that the 
chiefs support them. Any time the chiefs place a ban on charcoal burning, two things happen; (i) the 
amount of money charcoal burners pay to the chiefs before they can transport charcoal to the markets 
will be increased and (ii) the migrant  charcoal producers will mobilize a huge sum of money and pay 
to the chiefs. Similarly, if the ban was placed by the District Assemblies, the amount of money charcoal 
producers pay to secure council permit will automatically increase and the migrant charcoal burners will 
contribute huge sums of money and pay to the District Assembly officials. This has been the situation 
in the area, where the District Assemblies led by the District Chief Executives and the traditional 
authorities (chiefs) both collaborate and compete over the control of the charcoal resource. The district 
assemblies and the chiefs both deploy their own task forces to enforce compliance anytime they ban 
charcoal production. The task forces of the traditional authorities are also used to collect tax from the 
migrant charcoal producers.  The Chiefs always used rhetoric of the invasion and destruction of their 
lands by the Sissala migrants charcoal burners to justify attempts to gain greater control over the charcoal 
resource and over the migrants and levy more taxes on them. As a result of this, Assembly officials, not 
the Assemblies, and the chiefs benefit from the charcoal resources more than the poor charcoal burners 
most of whom are indigenes of the area. The majority of the people remain poor and marginalised. 
4.2. Conflict between chiefs over exercise of power over subjects and over legitimacy. 
‘The chiefs are fighting because every chief in this place wants to make money from charcoal’ said by 
a youth leader in West Gonja District. This statement exemplifies the importance chiefs in the area attach 
to the charcoal trade as a vital source of revenue, and the conflicts that emanate from charcoal production.  
This conflict emerged from within the local traditional political hierarchical structure in which different 
actors claim different privileges in relation to claims on land and natural resources based on the allodial 
rights and user rights. The production of charcoal and the competing claims of rent on resources from 
charcoal have intensified simmering tensions and   conflicts between chiefs of different traditional 
authority hierarchies (between paramount chiefs and divisional chiefs) and between chiefs  of the same 
made to the paramount chief who also collects rent and tax charges from the charcoal burners after the 
charcoal is produced. This, however, has been resolved in favour of the sub-chiefs and the landlords.
The migrant Sissala charcoal burners, in the Damongo area, are not charged for access to 
concessions, unlike in the other areas of the transitional and savannah zones. After visiting the chief and 
making the token payment, the migrant charcoal burners are given parcels of land where there are no 
farms to exploit the trees. However, the charcoal burners pay GH₵ 1.00 per every 50kg bag of charcoal 
produced. Producers usually transport between 300 to 400 bags per load of a single and double axel kia 
trucks respectively. This translate to monitory income of GH₵ 300.00 ($63.00) and 400.00 ($83.00) to 
the chiefs and the District Assemblies. With the long haulage articulator trucks, the charcoal burners 
pay between GH₵ 1000.00 (about $208.00) and GH₵ 1500.00 (about $313.00) for every load between 
1000 and 1500 50kg bags of charcoal respectively. Payments to the chiefs and the landlords are made 
after the charcoal has been produced. This has led to conflict between the rival chiefs in the area. In 
addition to paying these amounts to the sub-chiefs, similar payments are made to the paramount chiefs 
and to the District Assemblies through their Area Councils. In most of the communities, a separate 
payment is also made to the area councils. In all, before charcoal leaves the Damongo area to the urban 
markets, four different payments are made for four permits. Then another mandatory payment (which is 
considered controversial) is also paid to another chief in the central Gonja District where all the charcoal 
passes to the south. This has also led to the intensification of simmering tension between the paramount 
chief, and the divisional chief over power and the legitimacy of their power.  
4. Charcoal conflicts in the savannah and transition zones of Ghana
4.1. The conflict between local government and traditional authority (chiefs), over the regulation 
and control of charcoal resources.
Tree resources under the customary land tenure are recognized as belonging to the chief. The District 
Assemblies are responsible for enacting sound environmental policies for sustainable management of 
the environment and natural resources. The local government authority is headed by the District Chief 
Executive (DCE), and it collaborates or works with the Chiefs (traditional authorities) in many areas of 
development, including the management and regulation of natural resource use. Hence, they work 
together to threaten charcoal burners and actually introduce by-laws to ban charcoal burning on many 
occasions, using narratives of environmental decline. They consider charcoal production to be 
destroying the environment and resulting in desertification. These bans, any time they have been 
imposed they have been quickly lifted or not effective at all because tolls on charcoal production is one 
of the major revenue sources for the district assemblies in the transition and the savanna zones. The 
chiefs also depend on the rent on charcoal concessions for many purposes. 
The increasing commodification of natural resources and the pressure on District Assemblies to 
create revenue sources to generate revenue internally to supplement the governments’ common fund 
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4.1. The conflict between local government and traditional authority (chiefs), over the regulation 
and control of charcoal resources.
Tree resources under the customary land tenure are recognized as belonging to the chief. The District 
Assemblies are responsible for enacting sound environmental policies for sustainable management of 
the environment and natural resources. The local government authority is headed by the District Chief 
Executive (DCE), and it collaborates or works with the Chiefs (traditional authorities) in many areas of 
development, including the management and regulation of natural resource use. Hence, they work 
together to threaten charcoal burners and actually introduce by-laws to ban charcoal burning on many 
occasions, using narratives of environmental decline. They consider charcoal production to be 
destroying the environment and resulting in desertification. These bans, any time they have been 
imposed they have been quickly lifted or not effective at all because tolls on charcoal production is one 
of the major revenue sources for the district assemblies in the transition and the savanna zones. The 
chiefs also depend on the rent on charcoal concessions for many purposes. 
The increasing commodification of natural resources and the pressure on District Assemblies to 
create revenue sources to generate revenue internally to supplement the governments’ common fund 
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4.3. The conflict between chiefs and their subjects over allodial title and over rights to land and 
extraction of rents. 
Initially, the District Assembly in collaboration with the ministry of Agriculture and the chiefs   
manipulated environmental decline narratives that are rooted in a discourse of blame to force the sub-
chiefs to ban charcoal production in their communities. However, the sub-chiefs quickly realized that 
most of the youth in their communities had learnt how to burn charcoal from the migrant Sissala charcoal 
burners and were also seriously producing charcoal. The youth realized that it was more rewarding to 
do charcoal business than farming. So, most of the people in the communities went into charcoal 
production on their farms. The ban on charcoal therefore affected both the local people (indigenes) and 
the migrant Sissala charcoal burners. This did not go down well with the indigenes and led to a conflict 
between the youth and their chiefs because charcoal production has become a major source of livelihood 
for the people, especially the youth. According to the youth, agriculture was no longer profitable or 
rewarding. This view is clearly captured by a farmer who is also a charcoal producer in Kuputo, a village 
in the North Gonja District ‘for  eight years now I have not been able to harvest enough crops to feed 
my family  how much more to sell and pay for my children school fees, charcoal is my only helper now’. 
Views like this are common among the indigenes and show the importance of charcoal as a source of 
livelihood to the people. The youth claim that they have rights to the trees and must be allowed to 
continue to exploit them for charcoal. 
However, because the youth, or the indigenes have user rights to the land and the tree resources 
and therefore could not be charged any rent, the  chiefs are  usually less enthusiastic   to lift the ban on 
charcoal in the communities, while  at the same time the paramount chief’ acquiesces to the continuous  
operations of the migrant Sissala charcoal merchants in their concessions, because the paramount chief  
benefits from the extraction of rent from the migrant  charcoal burners which the chief cannot do to the 
youth who are indigenes and thus have user rights to the forest. The chiefs and elders say the youth are 
lazy and do not want to farm.  They claim that the youth are only interested in quick money. As a result, 
there are tensions and conflicts between the youth and the chiefs and the elders in the communities over 
the use of the charcoal resource and other natural resources (see Amanor 1999, 2001, 2009, and Yaro 
2010). 
4.4. Conflict between categories of producers with different access to resources and different 
claims on charcoal through market and birth rights.
‘This is our land; it belongs to us and we must benefit from it not strangers’ a statement by an indigene 
of Soalepe in the West Gonja District of Ghana. This statement highlights the tensions, contestations 
and struggles between indigenes and migrant charcoal producers over natural resources. The charcoal 
market in the savannah and transitional zones of Ghana is composed of migrant Sissala charcoal burners 
(made up of wood cutters, those who combine both wood cutting and charcoal burning and the 
hierarchy of traditional authority ( between a paramount chief and another paramount chief or between 
a divisional chief  and another divisional chief). My informants say that charcoal production and its 
trade has reignited and intensify contestations, tensions and conflicts between the overlord of the Gonja 
traditional area and a divisional chief over power and legitimacy.  There is also a chieftaincy dispute 
between two rival sub chiefs in Damango town who both claim the right to collect rent on charcoal in 
the Damango lands.  
As has been narrated above, charcoal burners have to make three mandatory payments (ie., to the 
chiefs, the District Assemblies and the Area Councils) for permits before they can transport their 
charcoal to the cities. This is expected to be the final payment. No other chief should also take any tax 
from them. However, the Buipe chief whose town the trucks pass to the urban markets in the Southern 
part of Ghana charges them mandatory fees before the trucks are allowed passage. This is considered an 
affront and disrespect to the powers and legitimacy of the overlord of the Gonja traditional area. The 
Buipe chief claims that, he has the right to collect taxes and rent from every charcoal truck from both 
the West Gonja and the North Gonja Districts passing through his town. The collection of taxes or rent 
by both the paramount chief and the divisional chief is a show of power by the two, at the same time
legitimizing their power (Lund 2008). 
Damango, the traditional and administrative capital of the Gonja land is the seat of the overlord. 
However, the Damango town has its own chief. Over a decade now, there has been a protracted 
chieftaincy conflict between two brothers who both claim to be the rightful successors to the skin 
(chieftaincy) office. This generated tension in the community between the rival chiefs and between their 
supporters. With the influx of the migrant Sissala charcoal burners into the area, and the increasing 
commodification of the natural resources, the two rival chiefs to the Damongo skin make competing 
claims as the allodial title holders to the Damongo land. The simmering tension between the two rival 
chiefs and their supporters was intensified and exploded into open confrontations over who has the right 
to collect rent from charcoal burners in the community. In resolving this conflict by the overlord, it was 
agreed that both rival chiefs should issue permits to charcoal burners (thus, charcoal burners could pay 
to any of the rival chiefs for their permits). Charcoal burners therefore decide which of the rival chiefs 
to pay their money to. The collection of rent from the charcoal burners and the granting of permits by 
rival chiefs has therefore led to competing parties claiming legitimacy of their powers. As Lund (2008, 
Sikor and Lund 2009) show, those who have control over land and natural resources use their powers to 
grant access or receive rent and at the same time legitimize their power and consolidate their position as 
allodial title holders. The rent from charcoal is a vital source of income to the chiefs in the area, hence, 
the competition for control over the charcoal resource. 
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4.3. The conflict between chiefs and their subjects over allodial title and over rights to land and 
extraction of rents. 
Initially, the District Assembly in collaboration with the ministry of Agriculture and the chiefs   
manipulated environmental decline narratives that are rooted in a discourse of blame to force the sub-
chiefs to ban charcoal production in their communities. However, the sub-chiefs quickly realized that 
most of the youth in their communities had learnt how to burn charcoal from the migrant Sissala charcoal 
burners and were also seriously producing charcoal. The youth realized that it was more rewarding to 
do charcoal business than farming. So, most of the people in the communities went into charcoal 
production on their farms. The ban on charcoal therefore affected both the local people (indigenes) and 
the migrant Sissala charcoal burners. This did not go down well with the indigenes and led to a conflict 
between the youth and their chiefs because charcoal production has become a major source of livelihood 
for the people, especially the youth. According to the youth, agriculture was no longer profitable or 
rewarding. This view is clearly captured by a farmer who is also a charcoal producer in Kuputo, a village 
in the North Gonja District ‘for  eight years now I have not been able to harvest enough crops to feed 
my family  how much more to sell and pay for my children school fees, charcoal is my only helper now’. 
Views like this are common among the indigenes and show the importance of charcoal as a source of 
livelihood to the people. The youth claim that they have rights to the trees and must be allowed to 
continue to exploit them for charcoal. 
However, because the youth, or the indigenes have user rights to the land and the tree resources 
and therefore could not be charged any rent, the  chiefs are  usually less enthusiastic   to lift the ban on 
charcoal in the communities, while  at the same time the paramount chief’ acquiesces to the continuous  
operations of the migrant Sissala charcoal merchants in their concessions, because the paramount chief  
benefits from the extraction of rent from the migrant  charcoal burners which the chief cannot do to the 
youth who are indigenes and thus have user rights to the forest. The chiefs and elders say the youth are 
lazy and do not want to farm.  They claim that the youth are only interested in quick money. As a result, 
there are tensions and conflicts between the youth and the chiefs and the elders in the communities over 
the use of the charcoal resource and other natural resources (see Amanor 1999, 2001, 2009, and Yaro 
2010). 
4.4. Conflict between categories of producers with different access to resources and different 
claims on charcoal through market and birth rights.
‘This is our land; it belongs to us and we must benefit from it not strangers’ a statement by an indigene 
of Soalepe in the West Gonja District of Ghana. This statement highlights the tensions, contestations 
and struggles between indigenes and migrant charcoal producers over natural resources. The charcoal 
market in the savannah and transitional zones of Ghana is composed of migrant Sissala charcoal burners 
(made up of wood cutters, those who combine both wood cutting and charcoal burning and the 
hierarchy of traditional authority ( between a paramount chief and another paramount chief or between 
a divisional chief  and another divisional chief). My informants say that charcoal production and its 
trade has reignited and intensify contestations, tensions and conflicts between the overlord of the Gonja 
traditional area and a divisional chief over power and legitimacy.  There is also a chieftaincy dispute 
between two rival sub chiefs in Damango town who both claim the right to collect rent on charcoal in 
the Damango lands.  
As has been narrated above, charcoal burners have to make three mandatory payments (ie., to the 
chiefs, the District Assemblies and the Area Councils) for permits before they can transport their 
charcoal to the cities. This is expected to be the final payment. No other chief should also take any tax 
from them. However, the Buipe chief whose town the trucks pass to the urban markets in the Southern 
part of Ghana charges them mandatory fees before the trucks are allowed passage. This is considered an 
affront and disrespect to the powers and legitimacy of the overlord of the Gonja traditional area. The 
Buipe chief claims that, he has the right to collect taxes and rent from every charcoal truck from both 
the West Gonja and the North Gonja Districts passing through his town. The collection of taxes or rent 
by both the paramount chief and the divisional chief is a show of power by the two, at the same time
legitimizing their power (Lund 2008). 
Damango, the traditional and administrative capital of the Gonja land is the seat of the overlord. 
However, the Damango town has its own chief. Over a decade now, there has been a protracted 
chieftaincy conflict between two brothers who both claim to be the rightful successors to the skin 
(chieftaincy) office. This generated tension in the community between the rival chiefs and between their 
supporters. With the influx of the migrant Sissala charcoal burners into the area, and the increasing 
commodification of the natural resources, the two rival chiefs to the Damongo skin make competing 
claims as the allodial title holders to the Damongo land. The simmering tension between the two rival 
chiefs and their supporters was intensified and exploded into open confrontations over who has the right 
to collect rent from charcoal burners in the community. In resolving this conflict by the overlord, it was 
agreed that both rival chiefs should issue permits to charcoal burners (thus, charcoal burners could pay 
to any of the rival chiefs for their permits). Charcoal burners therefore decide which of the rival chiefs 
to pay their money to. The collection of rent from the charcoal burners and the granting of permits by 
rival chiefs has therefore led to competing parties claiming legitimacy of their powers. As Lund (2008, 
Sikor and Lund 2009) show, those who have control over land and natural resources use their powers to 
grant access or receive rent and at the same time legitimize their power and consolidate their position as 
allodial title holders. The rent from charcoal is a vital source of income to the chiefs in the area, hence, 
the competition for control over the charcoal resource. 
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charcoal trade, but also enables the political elite and the merchant class with links to government 
bureaucrats and agencies and traditional authorities to capture the benefits of the charcoal trade. 
Larson and Ribot (2007) examine how forestry policy and implementation maintain double 
standards in an uneven playing field in a manner that permanently excludes the rural poor from the 
wealth of forest around them – producing poverty and marginalization in the process. They contend that,
like Ribot (1998) and Faye and Ribot (2017) double standards in forest and market access through the 
implementation of policies and regulations have tied the charcoal trade in the hands of a small privileged 
group of elite and well-connected patrons.  
It is therefore important to recognised that having direct control of access to forest and other natural 
resources (in terms of property rights) by people in the forest/resource communities without access to 
capital and markets is futile (Ribot 1998, 1999, Ribot and Peluso 2003), and that policies and their 
implementations can exacerbate inequality, unfair competition, resource capture, exclusion of the poor 
and conflicts. This also draws attention to the question many people have been asking- whether the 
chiefs are for the people or on the side of the government and merchant capital?  This is because resource 
communities are politically and economically stratified and elites such as chiefs often make decisions 
that are not in the interest of the community as a whole.  Recognising this will enable us to focus on 
how power and resources are distributed and contested in different contexts by social actors, and to get 
beneath the structures to unmask the underlying interests and incentives that are often embedded in
policy and the corresponding institutions that enable or constrain equity in the distribution of resource
benefits.  
5. Summery and conclusions 
Traditional political authority (chiefs), and the legislative political and administrative authority 
(Assemblies) collaborate, mediate and contest for power, authority and legitimation over the regulation 
and control of the charcoal resource. The chiefs are the custodians of the land. Article 245 of the 1992 
constitution of Ghana mandates the Assemblies to formulate and execute plans, policies and programs 
for the effective mobilization of the resources necessary for the development of their areas. Clearly, 
there is the need for collaboration, not competition, and conflicts between the chiefs and the Assemblies. 
In any case, it would be too simplistic to reduce these contests over natural resources to a straightforward 
conflict between the Assemblies and the chiefs over the revenue from charcoal. For these contests are 
also, probably, about struggles for legitimacy, power and resources. Hence, when traditional authorities 
(chiefs) use task forces in periodic and surprise raids on illegal charcoal producers and wood cutters, it 
is a statement about the deployment of power and authority to charcoal producers as it is to the District 
Assemblies and the other state institutions who are mandated to do so. These conflicts, as the study has 
shown, are not only between different institutions, but also occur within the hierarchies of institutions – 
the conflicts between chiefs over legitimacy and the exercise of power over the charcoal resource. The 
merchants who hired labourers to burn the charcoal) and the youth of the communities. Most of the 
migrant charcoal burners are organized into gangs headed by rich merchants who have links with the 
political authorities as chairmen. The migrant Sissala merchants have access to capital (in terms of 
finance from plough back profits, and equipment/tools), labour, authority (chiefs and the District 
Assembly officials) and also control the charcoal market. They also have the knowledge and experience 
in the charcoal business. The indigenes (the youth) of the area, unlike the migrant merchants, only have 
user rights to the forests. While the migrants mostly operate in gangs and thereby pooling their resources 
together, the indigenes operate individually. In view of this, the migrant merchants are able to gain 
access to large concessions, produce a lot of charcoal frequently and transport the charcoal to the various 
markets (which they also have control over). The migrants therefore dominate the charcoal trade in the 
area and also make more money than the indigenes. 
The indigenes therefore do not understand why they, having the user right to the resources, benefit 
marginally, while the migrants gain more benefits from the charcoal trade. They therefore blame the 
migrants for destroying the environment and must therefore be chased out of the area. The youth also 
claim that, the authorities (ie the chiefs and the DCEs) often connived and collude to apply the bye-laws 
differently in favour of the migrants and accuse the DCEs and the traditional authorities of 
discrimination.  According to the youth, anytime a ban was placed on  charcoal production, they the 
indigenes were not allowed to engage in  charcoal burning but the merchants were always allowed   to 
go on with their charcoal production with the excuse that, the merchants needed to recoup the 
investments they had already made on their concessions. They also accused the migrant charcoal burners 
of always breaking every ban and bye-law on the Gonja land and that with their financial muscle, the 
Sissala merchants were able to buy off the chiefs and the DCEs. As a result of these claims, the youth 
were also engaged in mobilizing the same narratives about charcoal that the Chiefs and the DCEs often 
manipulate, used and exploited to further their economic and political interests; and to justify their call 
for the migrants to be ban from their communities. The youth even went to the extent of courting and 
enlisting the support of environmental NGOs to put pressure on the overlord and the DCEs to ban 
migrant charcoal burners from the area.
Ribot (1998) observed that, communities that control direct access to forests may reap a small 
portion of its benefits, if they do not also have access to capital and markets; and that political elite and 
powerful entrepreneur class with linkages to political authority, and access to labour, capital, and control 
over charcoal markets, and aided by policy, benefited disproportionately from the charcoal trade in 
Senegal. In a similar study, Ribot (1999), in his historical account of the resistance of the forest villages 
of Makacoulibantang of eastern Senegal to charcoal production, reveals, not only how flawed, 
selectively and skewed implemented policies created a struggle and competition between local 
populations and powerful actors for the control of access to the benefits derived from forests and the 
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charcoal trade, but also enables the political elite and the merchant class with links to government 
bureaucrats and agencies and traditional authorities to capture the benefits of the charcoal trade. 
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standards in an uneven playing field in a manner that permanently excludes the rural poor from the 
wealth of forest around them – producing poverty and marginalization in the process. They contend that,
like Ribot (1998) and Faye and Ribot (2017) double standards in forest and market access through the 
implementation of policies and regulations have tied the charcoal trade in the hands of a small privileged 
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It is therefore important to recognised that having direct control of access to forest and other natural 
resources (in terms of property rights) by people in the forest/resource communities without access to 
capital and markets is futile (Ribot 1998, 1999, Ribot and Peluso 2003), and that policies and their 
implementations can exacerbate inequality, unfair competition, resource capture, exclusion of the poor 
and conflicts. This also draws attention to the question many people have been asking- whether the 
chiefs are for the people or on the side of the government and merchant capital?  This is because resource 
communities are politically and economically stratified and elites such as chiefs often make decisions 
that are not in the interest of the community as a whole.  Recognising this will enable us to focus on 
how power and resources are distributed and contested in different contexts by social actors, and to get 
beneath the structures to unmask the underlying interests and incentives that are often embedded in
policy and the corresponding institutions that enable or constrain equity in the distribution of resource
benefits.  
5. Summery and conclusions 
Traditional political authority (chiefs), and the legislative political and administrative authority 
(Assemblies) collaborate, mediate and contest for power, authority and legitimation over the regulation 
and control of the charcoal resource. The chiefs are the custodians of the land. Article 245 of the 1992 
constitution of Ghana mandates the Assemblies to formulate and execute plans, policies and programs 
for the effective mobilization of the resources necessary for the development of their areas. Clearly, 
there is the need for collaboration, not competition, and conflicts between the chiefs and the Assemblies. 
In any case, it would be too simplistic to reduce these contests over natural resources to a straightforward 
conflict between the Assemblies and the chiefs over the revenue from charcoal. For these contests are 
also, probably, about struggles for legitimacy, power and resources. Hence, when traditional authorities 
(chiefs) use task forces in periodic and surprise raids on illegal charcoal producers and wood cutters, it 
is a statement about the deployment of power and authority to charcoal producers as it is to the District 
Assemblies and the other state institutions who are mandated to do so. These conflicts, as the study has 
shown, are not only between different institutions, but also occur within the hierarchies of institutions – 
the conflicts between chiefs over legitimacy and the exercise of power over the charcoal resource. The 
merchants who hired labourers to burn the charcoal) and the youth of the communities. Most of the 
migrant charcoal burners are organized into gangs headed by rich merchants who have links with the 
political authorities as chairmen. The migrant Sissala merchants have access to capital (in terms of 
finance from plough back profits, and equipment/tools), labour, authority (chiefs and the District 
Assembly officials) and also control the charcoal market. They also have the knowledge and experience 
in the charcoal business. The indigenes (the youth) of the area, unlike the migrant merchants, only have 
user rights to the forests. While the migrants mostly operate in gangs and thereby pooling their resources 
together, the indigenes operate individually. In view of this, the migrant merchants are able to gain 
access to large concessions, produce a lot of charcoal frequently and transport the charcoal to the various 
markets (which they also have control over). The migrants therefore dominate the charcoal trade in the 
area and also make more money than the indigenes. 
The indigenes therefore do not understand why they, having the user right to the resources, benefit 
marginally, while the migrants gain more benefits from the charcoal trade. They therefore blame the 
migrants for destroying the environment and must therefore be chased out of the area. The youth also 
claim that, the authorities (ie the chiefs and the DCEs) often connived and collude to apply the bye-laws 
differently in favour of the migrants and accuse the DCEs and the traditional authorities of 
discrimination.  According to the youth, anytime a ban was placed on  charcoal production, they the 
indigenes were not allowed to engage in  charcoal burning but the merchants were always allowed   to 
go on with their charcoal production with the excuse that, the merchants needed to recoup the 
investments they had already made on their concessions. They also accused the migrant charcoal burners 
of always breaking every ban and bye-law on the Gonja land and that with their financial muscle, the 
Sissala merchants were able to buy off the chiefs and the DCEs. As a result of these claims, the youth 
were also engaged in mobilizing the same narratives about charcoal that the Chiefs and the DCEs often 
manipulate, used and exploited to further their economic and political interests; and to justify their call 
for the migrants to be ban from their communities. The youth even went to the extent of courting and 
enlisting the support of environmental NGOs to put pressure on the overlord and the DCEs to ban 
migrant charcoal burners from the area.
Ribot (1998) observed that, communities that control direct access to forests may reap a small 
portion of its benefits, if they do not also have access to capital and markets; and that political elite and 
powerful entrepreneur class with linkages to political authority, and access to labour, capital, and control 
over charcoal markets, and aided by policy, benefited disproportionately from the charcoal trade in 
Senegal. In a similar study, Ribot (1999), in his historical account of the resistance of the forest villages 
of Makacoulibantang of eastern Senegal to charcoal production, reveals, not only how flawed, 
selectively and skewed implemented policies created a struggle and competition between local 
populations and powerful actors for the control of access to the benefits derived from forests and the 
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of the forest villages of Makacoulibantang of Senegal to charcoal production. Ribot, in his historical 
account of the resistance of the forest villages of Makacoulibantang of eastern Senegal to charcoal 
production, reveals, not only how flawed, selectively and skewed implemented policies created a 
struggle and competition between local populations and powerful actors for the control of access to the 
benefits derived from forests and the charcoal trade, but also enables the political elite and the merchant 
class with links to government agencies and traditional authorities to capture the benefits. 
6. Conclusion
Policies and their implementations are not neutral. The political conflicts that engulfed the production 
of charcoal in the savannah and transitional zones of Ghana show how policies can be manipulated, 
exploited and used in an attempt to control, and to capture the benefits that are derived from natural 
resources. Chiefs have, on the one hand acted, contested, disputed and competed over allodial rights to 
land and natural resources, and the control over the benefits that are derived from them. The local 
governments have, on the other hand cooperated with the traditional authorities, in most times to regulate 
the use of natural resources but sometimes too competed with the same institution for the control and 
extraction of rent and revenue from the charcoal resource. Through these struggles, the chiefs strengthen 
and consolidate their legitimacy and power in relation to their competitors.  The charcoal merchants 
who manipulated, and are being manipulated by the system also competed with the poor youth of the 
area for the benefits of the charcoal trade. Clearly, the winners are the powerful elite – chiefs, the District 
Assembly officials and the few powerful charcoal merchant-class who had access to capital, labour, 
markets and most importantly, access to the political authorities. The losers are the village populations, 
who are alienated and marginalized.
There is therefore the need for policies and their implementation to be recognized as negotiated 
outcomes involving multiple actors with different cultures, powers and interests. Instead of merely 
reaffirming assumptions within national policy processes, policies that are implemented at the local 
community level must reflect conditions on the ground and be responsive to the needs and interests of 
the people (Amanor et al. 2005).  
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issue of permits, and collection of rent and taxes from resource users, by the chiefs simultaneously 
strengthens and legitimatizes their power and authority in relation to their competitors (Lund 2008, Sikor 
and Lund 2009).  
Another important issue the study highlights is the conflict between the chiefs and the youth over 
right to land and tree resources. The state recognizes the allodial rights as being vested in the chief and 
user rights in the indigenes (subjects). This allows indigenes to use land and trees freely for farming, 
charcoal production and many other purposes but does not allow the indigenes to sell their land, since 
the land by customs belongs to the skin. Chiefs can therefore transact trees and natural resources with 
migrants, but not with the indigenes who have rights to use the trees freely.
Since the chiefs cannot gain or extract revenue from the youth who are indigenes, they are often 
interested in transacting trees and land with the migrant charcoal producers. This has led to the conflicts 
between the youth and the chiefs since the youth wants to protect their own use of the trees, and the 
chiefs are interested in transacting the trees with the migrants and to prevent the indigenes from 
exercising their use over the natural resources (see Amanor et al. 2005, and Amanor 2009 for a detail 
discussion).  
In view of this, Ribot (1999), like Amanor (1999) and Cline-cole (2000), questions the legitimacy 
of traditional authority, whether chiefs actually represent their communities or their self-interests? and 
draw attention to the contradictions inherent in the chieftaincy institution as a colonial tool for indirect 
rule and resource appropriation. Further, Ribot (1999) implicates policies for their frequent failure to 
recognise that a ‘community’ is not made up of a homogenous population, but according to Ribot (1999)
are ‘stratified ensemble of persons with different needs and power’. Hence, powerful actors, in collusion 
with policy agents, can manipulate policy processes and implementations to capture the benefits of 
forests and the charcoal trade.
Finally, the conflict between the indigenes and the migrant charcoal producers indicate that there 
is no balance use of the natural resource by the locals and other actors. The resources tend to be 
concentrated in the hands of both traditional and government institutions and elites, who use policy to 
their own advantage. The study reveals that the indigenes or the local people are not able to compete 
effectively with the migrants for the production of charcoal because they do not have access to capital, 
labour, transport and markets. The indigenes are further constrained by the differential application of 
by-laws and rules by both the chiefs and the District Assemblies; and the preference of the chiefs to 
transact land and resources with the migrants than to allowing access to the same resources by the 
indigenes, since the chiefs cannot gain revenue from them (indigenes). The only way the citizens can 
protect their own use of the resources is to fight for the expulsion of the migrant charcoal producers in 
the communities. This insight corroborates the view that forest communities that control direct access 
to forests may reap very small portion of the benefits from the resource if they do not also have access 
to markets and capital (Ribot 1998). This finding is also similar to Ribot (1999) account of the resistance 
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of the forest villages of Makacoulibantang of Senegal to charcoal production. Ribot, in his historical 
account of the resistance of the forest villages of Makacoulibantang of eastern Senegal to charcoal 
production, reveals, not only how flawed, selectively and skewed implemented policies created a 
struggle and competition between local populations and powerful actors for the control of access to the 
benefits derived from forests and the charcoal trade, but also enables the political elite and the merchant 
class with links to government agencies and traditional authorities to capture the benefits. 
6. Conclusion
Policies and their implementations are not neutral. The political conflicts that engulfed the production 
of charcoal in the savannah and transitional zones of Ghana show how policies can be manipulated, 
exploited and used in an attempt to control, and to capture the benefits that are derived from natural 
resources. Chiefs have, on the one hand acted, contested, disputed and competed over allodial rights to 
land and natural resources, and the control over the benefits that are derived from them. The local 
governments have, on the other hand cooperated with the traditional authorities, in most times to regulate 
the use of natural resources but sometimes too competed with the same institution for the control and 
extraction of rent and revenue from the charcoal resource. Through these struggles, the chiefs strengthen 
and consolidate their legitimacy and power in relation to their competitors.  The charcoal merchants 
who manipulated, and are being manipulated by the system also competed with the poor youth of the 
area for the benefits of the charcoal trade. Clearly, the winners are the powerful elite – chiefs, the District 
Assembly officials and the few powerful charcoal merchant-class who had access to capital, labour, 
markets and most importantly, access to the political authorities. The losers are the village populations, 
who are alienated and marginalized.
There is therefore the need for policies and their implementation to be recognized as negotiated 
outcomes involving multiple actors with different cultures, powers and interests. Instead of merely 
reaffirming assumptions within national policy processes, policies that are implemented at the local 
community level must reflect conditions on the ground and be responsive to the needs and interests of 
the people (Amanor et al. 2005).  
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issue of permits, and collection of rent and taxes from resource users, by the chiefs simultaneously 
strengthens and legitimatizes their power and authority in relation to their competitors (Lund 2008, Sikor 
and Lund 2009).  
Another important issue the study highlights is the conflict between the chiefs and the youth over 
right to land and tree resources. The state recognizes the allodial rights as being vested in the chief and 
user rights in the indigenes (subjects). This allows indigenes to use land and trees freely for farming, 
charcoal production and many other purposes but does not allow the indigenes to sell their land, since 
the land by customs belongs to the skin. Chiefs can therefore transact trees and natural resources with 
migrants, but not with the indigenes who have rights to use the trees freely.
Since the chiefs cannot gain or extract revenue from the youth who are indigenes, they are often 
interested in transacting trees and land with the migrant charcoal producers. This has led to the conflicts 
between the youth and the chiefs since the youth wants to protect their own use of the trees, and the 
chiefs are interested in transacting the trees with the migrants and to prevent the indigenes from 
exercising their use over the natural resources (see Amanor et al. 2005, and Amanor 2009 for a detail 
discussion).  
In view of this, Ribot (1999), like Amanor (1999) and Cline-cole (2000), questions the legitimacy 
of traditional authority, whether chiefs actually represent their communities or their self-interests? and 
draw attention to the contradictions inherent in the chieftaincy institution as a colonial tool for indirect 
rule and resource appropriation. Further, Ribot (1999) implicates policies for their frequent failure to 
recognise that a ‘community’ is not made up of a homogenous population, but according to Ribot (1999)
are ‘stratified ensemble of persons with different needs and power’. Hence, powerful actors, in collusion 
with policy agents, can manipulate policy processes and implementations to capture the benefits of 
forests and the charcoal trade.
Finally, the conflict between the indigenes and the migrant charcoal producers indicate that there 
is no balance use of the natural resource by the locals and other actors. The resources tend to be 
concentrated in the hands of both traditional and government institutions and elites, who use policy to 
their own advantage. The study reveals that the indigenes or the local people are not able to compete 
effectively with the migrants for the production of charcoal because they do not have access to capital, 
labour, transport and markets. The indigenes are further constrained by the differential application of 
by-laws and rules by both the chiefs and the District Assemblies; and the preference of the chiefs to 
transact land and resources with the migrants than to allowing access to the same resources by the 
indigenes, since the chiefs cannot gain revenue from them (indigenes). The only way the citizens can 
protect their own use of the resources is to fight for the expulsion of the migrant charcoal producers in 
the communities. This insight corroborates the view that forest communities that control direct access 
to forests may reap very small portion of the benefits from the resource if they do not also have access 
to markets and capital (Ribot 1998). This finding is also similar to Ribot (1999) account of the resistance 
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